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INTRODUCTION 
 
The modern world suffers from a poverty epidemic. One proposed 
solution to this problem is microcredit, or microfinance, the concept of giving 
small loans to those who do not have access to the traditional banking institutions 
because they lack collateral, a steady job, or a credit history. The idea is that the 
loan will be repaid through profits gained from entrepreneurial endeavors of the 
debtor. Modern microfinance institutions (MFIs) come in many forms: NGOs, 
commercial banks, private banks, and financial institutions. Generally, these 
institutions choose to offer loans to groups within a community in order to create 
social collateral and hold all loan holders in a group responsible for one another 
(Fishman, 2012).  
Microfinance is often advocated as the tool that will eradicate poverty in 
the twenty-first century, and its elevated portrayal may lead some to the 
conclusion that microcredit is the one-stop shop in the future of volunteerism and 
aid. However, upon serious consideration, it is apparent that the industry has 
many weaknesses that are not indicative of moral or effective practices. The 
validity of microfinance institutions as poverty alleviation instruments is drawn 
into question by the structure and practices of the industry, which hinder the 
efficiency and depth of aid. This paper aims to outline the history and popularity 
of microfinance, followed by the difficulties of its implementation. Then, it will 
explain the scope of research in the field, microcredit’s role in the empowerment 
of women, and the perception of microfinance in the West. Finally, it will discuss 
the monumental ideological shifts within the industry and their consequential 
negative effects on the field. 
 
HISTORY AND POPULARITY  
 
According to the United Nations estimates of world poverty, in 2012, 896 
million people lived on less than $1.90 a day. At higher poverty lines, 2.2 billion 
people lived on less than $3.10 a day in 2011 (United Nations, 2004). 
Microfinance is often championed as the means to eliminate global poverty and 
has gained immense attention and popularity in recent decades as a cure-all 
poverty reduction tool. The United Nations even projected 2005 to be the 
international year of microcredit (United Nations, 2004). Additionally, in 2006, 
Muhammad Yunis and the Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
for “their efforts to create economic and social development from below"(The 
Nobel Peace Prize 2006, 2014). Subsequently, nations and organizations poured 
funding into the establishment of microfinance. For instance, in Bangladesh, 
microfinance exploded as a poverty reduction tactic, yet, despite this dramatic 
increase in funding, there has been little change in the poverty levels of the region 
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(Ali, 2014). Thus, after more than two decades, questions of the effectiveness of 
microfinance begin to arise.   
Historically, the roots of microfinance were in informal banking. 
However, in the 1970’s, the establishment of the Grameen bank pushed 
microfinance into the global eye (Fishman, 2012). In India, microfinance began in 
as a public initiative called the Initiated Rural Development Program (IRDP) to 
reach rural households and provide reasonable aid with hopes that it could prove 
sustainable, although the IRDP was eventually deemed incredibly corrupt. It was 
reformed in the 1990’s with the onset of neoliberal shifts through which 
microfinance was presented as a tool to facilitate capitalism (Taylor, 2011). The 
establishment of modern microfinance can be traced to Dr. Muhammad Yunus 
who drew attention to the idea that a lack of access to credit was a main cause of 
poverty. He consequently established the Grameen Bank in India, which quickly 
received international praise as a revolutionary means of poverty alleviation (Ali, 
2014) and the expansion of microfinance has been substantial in the past two 
decades. With this enlargement, and a shift in the Indian political sphere toward 
liberalization, microfinance produced a private sector strain of institutions 
(MFI’s) which function as for-profit establishments financed by commercial 
banks and investors (Taylor, 2011). These institutions often operate in self-
interest and have changed the nature of the field significantly. MFIs are separate 
institutions from standard banks because of high transaction costs, difficulty of 
obtaining collateral, and short loan duration (Ambrish, 2014). The substantial 
investment in the field reflects the unusual consensus of confidence regarding the 
microfinance system.  
 
THE REALITY OF THE FIELD  
 
However, there are multiple fundamental issues with the institution of 
microfinance and the effectiveness of its implementation because of lack of 
consideration for the market. For instance, Megan Moodie, a professor at UC 
Santa Cruz, suggests that microfinance operations may amplify the existing 
vulnerabilities of the clients they aim to help (Moodie, 2013). An institution that 
ignores the glaring limits of the markets in the rural communities it attempts to 
reach is engaging in unproductive and wishful thinking, and ironically, the 
dialogue surrounding microfinance is in terms of the risk and benefit of the lender 
instead of the borrower (Moodie, 2013). The fact remains that just because a man 
has the means and tools to start a business, he will not necessarily be met with 
sufficient demand for his products. Similarly, while there is potential that the 
increase in vendors of certain markets through microfinance may aid some sellers, 
it may also displace other individuals already in the market. As a result, it would 
merely redistribute poverty rather than make any concrete improvements. In such 
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a case, there is risk that microfinance is a solution which creates a fixed pie 
resolution to poverty (Khan 2009). A zero sum approach however, requires a 
market for funded goods. Equally as concerning is the fact that most microcredit 
funding goes toward entrepreneurial endeavors when the glaring reality is that not 
every person is, or has the skills to be, an entrepreneur.   
Another main concern of the practice of microfinance it is essentially 
impossible to ensure that microloans are allocated toward so called “sustainable 
expenditures.” Many individuals choose to use their loans simply for consumption 
spending which is neither productive nor sustainable (Khan, 2009). In fact, many 
use the microloan as provisions for non-income producing items and income 
shocks such as repaying debts, planning weddings, or rebuilding a home 
(Roodman, 2012). Similarly, there are challenges to holding the assets, such as 
livestock or farming materials, which microloans could traditionally fund.  For 
instance, livestock may require veterinary care or a farmer may not be prepared 
for a year of drought. Essentially, due to a lack of savings, the borrower has no 
capacity to handle income shocks (Fishman, 2012). In total, the reality of 
assuming that each loan contributes to establishing a successful small business 
venture is unrealistic and misguided.  
Partially because of an increased focus on sustainability figures, there is a 
concerning lack of research on the effects of microfinance. Currently, there is 
simply insufficient evidence to claim that microfinance is an effective tool to 
those truly in poverty (Khan, 2009). As of 2009, research shows mixed results, 
which do little to justify the incredible amount of funding poured into the 
microfinance industry annually (Khan, 2009). Although there are millions of 
dollars donated toward fighting poverty every year, very little energy is allocated 
toward evaluating what kind of aid is most necessary and effective (Roodman, 
2012). The fact is that the effects of microcredit can be as varied as the clients 
who take out loans (Roodman, 2012). Thus, it is invalid to claim microfinance as 
the catch-all poverty reduction tactic as it is often presented.  
This ambiguity is exemplified in the divide which exists in the debate 
regarding microfinance subsidization. The proponents of subsidization argue that 
on one hand, were microfinance truly the ultimate tool to fight poverty, then even 
the poorest should have access to it. If interest rates do not cover the increased 
costs of reaching that demographic then donors should make up the difference 
(Roodman, 2012). However, opponents argue for the importance of the industry’s 
self-sustainability. A second disconnect lies in defining the source of poverty and 
how it will be cured. Dr. Yunus originally attributed poverty to institutional flaws, 
maintaining that the poor have skills which are undiscovered and unutilized. The 
fault that some may find in this theory is that it does not recognize or account for 
the range of capabilities of the impoverished. Simply providing someone the tools 
to create a product does little to guarantee that there will be a market for the 
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merchandise, and this assumption may even displace individuals already present 
as sellers in a specific market with finite demands (Khan, 2009). 
 
WOMEN AND MICROFINANCE 
 
One of the greatest accolades of microfinance is its potential to empower 
women in rural communities who are traditionally underprivileged in the 
household or society. Again, the results are overwhelmingly mixed. At its best, 
microfinance has the potential to provide women the tools to be self-sufficient 
actors in communities where they could not have been before (Moodie 2013). 
However, it would seem that this hope is often unrealistic.  Initially, in addition to 
the social benefits, women were the target group of MFIs because of their 
perceived reliability as clients. As MFIs grew, they used intermediaries such as 
NGOs to lower transaction costs. These loans primarily went to groups of women 
which, in the minds of NGOs, were being empowered and represented through the 
process of becoming financially literate. However, in the perspective of policy 
makers, these processes served as self-selection to reduce costs and probability of 
default. It was a tool in moving toward the goal of self-sustaining microfinance 
institutions and a process geared toward effectiveness, not merit of aid (Taylor, 
2011).  
Unfortunately, this process often gives primarily male loan officers power 
over the primarily female borrowing population (Roodman, 2012). Additionally, 
microfinance has not been demonstrated to alleviate the strain of basic human 
needs such as food or shelter. Specifically, for women, this peril holds serious 
weight as microfinance has been presented as a means for women’s 
empowerment. In the most cynical view, there is even evidence to suggest that 
there is an increased likelihood that these women become victims of household 
violence as amplified stress and anxiety surrounding debt magnify tensions and 
create new forms of social dominance (Moodie, 2013). In addition, although 
women take out loans, it is often men who actually go on to use the money. This 
peril arises for women because of the borrowing as well as the requirements 
which they submit to when agreeing to a loan which places them in a position of 
weakness (Moodie, 2013). Unfortunately, the industry is not the safe-haven it is 
often perceived to be for women. 
 
THE PERCEPTIVE OF THE WEST  
 
One of the greatest testaments of the Western world’s misunderstanding of 
microfinance is the popularity and processes of Kiva.org.  Kiva, a website 
dedicated to collecting donations and giving it to MFIs, has become enormously 
popular through its peer-to-peer approach. By providing potential lenders with 
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photos and descriptions of “entrepreneurs,” Kiva creates a sentiment of personal 
connection to the borrowers (Moodie, 2013). Much of the draw of microfinance, 
specifically in the personal method presented by Kiva, is that the lender would be 
“helping a person help themselves.” In reality, however, Kiva has no follow up 
process for what happens once a lender’s money is delivered to an MFI. Kiva’s 
simple portrayal of microfinance is not an accurate representation of the 
complicated process through which money is filtered. The money goes through 
Kiva and a microfinance institution before being delivered to a lender similar to 
the one pictured. The money then may or may not be used for an entrepreneurial 
enterprise because often, borrowers tell lenders what they want to hear out of 
simple self-interest. A study of a group of women receiving microloans in 
Bangladesh revealed that a marginal minority of the women were using the loans 
for their intended purposes (Roodman, 2012). Kiva’s intention, however, is only 
to provide funding to the MFIs, who they deem to be the true experts, and hold 
that their MFI partners in the field should not be micromanaged or supervised by 
Kiva (Moodie, 2013). The result, however, is that after the funding, Kiva holds no 
accountability for the people served by the MFIs (Moodie, 2013). The focus is on 
the loan and the risk of the lender rather than that of the borrower, and the 
borrowers’ needs are rarely discussed as part of this risk (Moodie, 2013). Kiva 
plays to the West’s lingering paternalistic approach to aid and intentionally 
ignores the weaknesses of the industry.  
 
CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
 
A neoliberal perspective of poverty states that the poor are capable of 
achieving financial independence if they are part of the free market. Currently, 
most microfinance institutions work from a neoliberal premise. This neoliberal 
idea of poverty thus suggests that when the poor fail to lift themselves from 
poverty, the blame is placed on the victims, which then legitimizes the coercive 
tactics of recovery used by lenders (Ali, 2014).The vast majority of microfinance 
institutions work within neoliberal terms, which essentially frees them from the 
concern of poverty reduction.  
Additionally, the microfinance industry’s affiliation with Wall Street is a 
new wave of microfinance that focuses on its financial sustainability rather than 
the decline of poverty. The result is an increased pairing of banks with 
microfinance institutions (Moodie, 2013). The reality is that with this change, the 
institution becomes a business rather than an institution whose goal is to lift 
people from poverty. While ideally, both models may be possible simultaneously, 
under these practices, the microfinance industry shows the damaging effects of 
profit concerns in the field of aid.  
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The criticisms of microfinance are often credited to the shift of the 
institution from service to profit. In recent years, organizations have made the 
effort to minimize reliance on grants and adhere to a policy of loan repayment 
which requires interest (Khan, 2009).  Many institutions have a “double bottom 
line” referring to their goal for financial sustainability paired with maintaining 
some level of service. However, in order to provide small loans to rural areas and 
feasibly still cover costs, interest rates usually must be high (Khan, 2009). 
Additionally, this change often affects the mindset of fieldworkers. They may be 
more inclined to provide loans to an individual who cannot pay them off in the 
name of financial gain (Khan, 2009). This shift was deemed necessary by the idea 
that a profit driven model of microfinance allows for greater penetration of the 
market of poor individuals (Taylor, 2011). The divide lies in the fact that 
microfinance analysis follows two approaches: the “welfarist” and the 
“institutionalist.” The welfarists’ focus lies in providing fiscal services rather than 
financial sustainability (Adhikary & Papachristou, 2014). Contrastingly, 
institutionalists value sound financial organization and tend to provide services to 
more clients, but at a decreased depth of the services. Generally, this focus on 
quantity usually serves better-off clients, overlooking small recipients with small 
loans and undermining the commonly argued strengths of these policies that “the 
commercial viability of MFIs increases with the number of borrowers” (Adhikary 
& Papachristou, 2014). Furthermore, this pressure of sustainability may take away 
from monitoring of client impact in favor of lender impact (Khan 2009). 
The consequences of the shift to a for-profit model in microfinance are 
substantial as the focus, goals, and results of the industry shift as well. One of the 
biggest and most widely criticized changes is the increase in interest rates. As 
institutions move toward a goal of sustainability, and even profit, the natural 
result is an increase in interest rates. In order to cover the costs of providing 
financial services in rural areas, these interest rates are considerably higher than 
what Western borrowers would find reasonable. This increase is not inherently 
unfair; however, many institutions have increased their interest rates further with 
the intention of maximizing profits. With interest rates ranging from 30 to 60 
percent and being implemented in multiple forms, it is difficult for rural 
borrowers to protect themselves from falling into an inescapable cycle of debt.   
Furthermore, loan providers are aware that many of the borrowers are 
financially illiterate. Often, borrowers demand no explanation of the terms of a 
loan before agreeing. This opens a door to exploitation in an industry in which the 
original intention was aid. For example, implemented widely, a deceptive flat 
interest rate effectively doubles the interest on the loan by requiring interest in the 
full loan amount even as the owed amount declines after payments (Roodman, 
2012). Thus, without transparent prices, borrowers are deprived of the opportunity 
to compare policies. In some cases, interest rates even increase as loan amount 
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decreases in order to maintain profits (Ambrish, 2014). Such practices are an 
obvious departure from an attitude which had upheld microfinance as an arm of 
international aid similar to donation. Mahammad Yunus (2011), one of the 
pioneers of microfinance himself, openly condemned this change in a New York 
Times article:  
 
In the 1970s, when I began working here on what would eventually be 
called “microcredit,” one of my goals was to eliminate the presence of 
loan sharks who grow rich by preying on the poor. In 1983, I founded 
Grameen Bank to provide small loans that people, especially poor women, 
could use to bring themselves out of poverty. At that time, I never 
imagined that one day microcredit would give rise to its own breed of loan 
sharks. Commercialization has been a terrible wrong turn for 
microfinance, and it indicates a worrying “mission drift” in the motivation 
of those lending to the poor. Poverty should be eradicated, not seen as a 
money-making opportunity. 
 
Such explicit criticism from one of the founders of modern microfinance speaks 
as a testament to the problems within the industry. Critics argue, however, that 
Grameen bank is in the unique position of being an attraction to donors because of 
its history and name recognition, which other institutions simply do not have 
(Roodman, 2012).  
Another weakness of microfinance’s shift to profit is the widespread use 
of loan recovery rates as indicators of success. The microfinance industry often 
measures success in the ability of borrowers to repay loans on time, yet there 
seems to be little correlation between actual economic empowerment and higher 
loan repayment(Ali, 2014). Nonetheless, microfinance institutions tout their high 
recovery rates (Ali, 2014). Thus, the measure of repayment which is used so often 
as a testament to the strength of the microfinance practice is not concretely 
connected to escape from poverty. Essentially, the financial practices of MFI’s 
range from reasonable to unjust and accurate to delusional.  
As institutions look to maximize profits and please investors, a main 
criticism is that they intentionally forgo providing loans to the poorest members 
of the population because they are typically less profitable. By attempting to 
reduce costs by “clustering,” institutions leave some parts of the market 
oversaturated and others in need. The initial costs of going to remote locations 
discourage MFIs from establishing there (Ambrish, 2014). Many institutions’ 
hesitance to provide loans to individuals without an existing source of income 
excludes the poorest sector of the population. There is also evidence that some of 
the poorer clients who are offered loans choose not to take them out of fear that 
they will not be able to repay them (Khan, 2009). This clear limit of the industry 
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is born out of focus on profit. The purpose of microfinance institutions is 
bypassed by measuring success through earnings. 
 
LENDING PRACTICES  
 
With the shift toward sustainable microfinance practices, a great increase 
in breadth of provided loans increases profits of MFIs. However, it is not 
necessarily accompanied by assurance that a borrower has the capacity to repay a 
loan. Thus, there is accusation of aggressive lending practices being implemented 
on the part of microfinance institutions. A main concern is the willingness to lend 
to the financially illiterate, and the lack of accountability to create fair practices in 
such a case. Many individuals take out loans knowing only how to sign their 
names and having no real idea what the parameters and possible repercussions of 
the agreement are (Ambrish, 2014). Microfinance NGO’s earn profit from hidden 
fees, service charges, unregulated interest rates, and obligatory savings (Ali, 
2014). For example, in Bangladesh, it is a known practice to give intentionally 
vague or complicated parameters to a loan, or even provide unwritten contracts 
(Roodman, 2012). Often, repayment begins almost immediately after a loan is 
given, which is not a realistic time frame to build business or reap profits (Khan, 
2009). An explanation of the continued of compliance of the impoverished is 
financial illiteracy: essentially, a debt trap (Taylor, 2011). This phenomenon also 
often results in multiple institutions lending to the same borrowers (Fishman, 
2012). Cross borrowing, or multiple borrowing, demonstrates the ineffectiveness 
of such practices. It is clear however, that the practice is common and widespread 
in regions with multiple MFIs. As a result, such practices create the idea of debt 
as a social norm, which perpetuates uninformed and ill-advised borrowing 
(Roodman, 2012).  
After these loans have been outlined and implemented, the debate then 
turns to the means by which loans are recovered. Loans are often issued according 
to the concept of group lending. Members of a community must choose to be tied 
to one another in their loans and, if one member defaults, the other members will 
be held responsible. The result is immense social pressure. In some cases, this 
practice increases effectiveness and accountability. However, it also provides 
opportunity for the exploitation of these groups by MFIs or for the group 
members to act out against one another if a member defaults. This problem of 
exploitation is compounded by the fact that currently, there is little regulation 
across the MFI field (Ambrish, 2014). As such, the recovery process can become 
entrenched in violence and exploitation. For example, NGO’s in Bangladesh 
perpetuate violence through the creation of imbalanced power structures, 
institutional practices, and unequal opportunities, and can come in the form of 
direct as well as structural violence. Examples of this aggression include creating 
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unequal power relations in the community, manipulation of groups of women to 
oppress their peers, and shaming (Ali, 2014). In addition, within groups and at the 
hands of microfinance institutions, the poorest clients are often bypassed in loan 
consideration because they are not believed to be able to repay (Ali, 2014). 
In the most extremes cases, there have been serious accusations of the 
immoral and aggressive acts of microfinance institutions leading individuals to 
commit suicide. In 2010, in the Indian state Andhra Pradesh, the suicides of 
multiples impoverished borrowers, who faced incredible debt and underwent 
hostile tactics of collection, drew negative attention to the MFI’s and resulted in 
widespread loan defaults (Taylor, 2011). The concentration of MFIs in Andhra 
Pradesh was caused by the neoliberal reforms pursued by the state government 
and the promotion of microfinance as a means of aiding the community (Taylor, 
2011). MFI’s soon began to seek external shareholders, which consequently 
marginalized the borrowers’ role in the system as institutions looked to build their 
base and expand monetary gain (Taylor, 2011). In many cases, the groups began 
lending to individuals who already had financing from another institution (Taylor, 
2011). This market oversaturation resulted in a bubble in Indian microfinance. 
Many households took out multiple loans, paying off one with another and 
numerous suicides were then linked to the questionable tactics of collection 
agents (Taylor, 2011). As a result, more than 80 people committed suicide in the 
region after defaulting on microloans. The shame facilitated by group lending in 
many of these cultures for loan defaults suggests that suicide is not at all of 
unheard of or uncommon. There is even fear that the collapse of repayment in 
Andhra Pradesh could spread to similarly glutted regions of the microfinance 
industry if recovery practices remain the same (Fishman, 2012). This crisis 
brought skepticism of microfinance to the forefront of governmental and public 
attention. The financial commitments of large world governments and upswing in 
private investment to microfinance were subsequently questioned (Taylor, 2011). 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
As a practice, microcredit is meant to harness the resources of capitalism 
and allocate them among the poor and impoverished. Founded primarily in South 
Asia, it’s an inspiring idea that a person could be lifted from poverty with only a 
small loan. Upon closer inspection, however, research reveals flaws with the 
practicality of microfinance as an industry and even just as a practice. The 
primary assumption of the field that every person can be an entrepreneur 
regardless of background, market limitations, or intelligence has been 
demonstrated to be problematic. Similarly, the reality of these loans is that they 
are often used for purposes other than the entrepreneurial pitch for which they 
were attained. Statistical and social evidence gives at best mixed results in favor 
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of the microfinance as an all-purpose poverty reduction method. The infatuation 
of Western cultures with the solution of microfinance is understandable given the 
incredible ambiguity with which most institutions discuss the practice. People 
become enamored with the idea of helping the women whose photo they’ve 
connected to via screen. In reality, their money is being filtered through a 
bureaucracy to a person who may or may not bear resemblance to the woman 
pictured. Essentially, recognizing the industry for what it is, rather than what 
people hope it to be, can be a daunting task.  
Another realization made apparent in the research was the real effect of 
the liberalization of microfinance and the subsequent shift toward a goal of 
sustainability and profitability. This shift changes the very foundation of the 
industry, the effects of microcredit services foundationally, and has not been 
properly recognized as a destructive influence in the industry. Microfinance’s 
potential for good has resulted in unquestioned positivity toward it as an idea, 
regardless of the uncertainty of its benefits in the target communities. In 
approaching the subject of microfinance, it is important to evaluate its actual role 
in the service industry. Historically founded from criticism of the practices of loan 
sharks, microfinance has nonetheless succumbed to similar deviations in its 
mission.  
The microfinance industry has great potential as a means for providing 
financial services to those who are traditionally excluded by the market. However, 
the impression most of the world has on the current effects of such practices is 
misled. On an individual basis, there is much potential for microloans to create a 
solution to poverty via self-help. However, as an actual practice and field of 
poverty reduction, there are glaring problems in the implementation of 
microfinance in a safe, effective, and realistic way. These problems are 
compounded by the industry’s current focus on profit and sustainability, which 
further distract from the original focus of poverty alleviation. Further, the 
industry, and its research, is often self-serving and focused on loan recovery. 
Microfinance, although born out of honorable intentions, often creates a culture of 
exploitation between the lender borrower relationships. It appears that there will 
have to be widespread reform of the industry before the practice could ever be 
condoned as a whole. There is indeed potential for microfinance to be an effective 
tool in the world of poverty reduction as are clearly cases of people being aided in 
a positive way through microloans. However, the existing flaws lead to the belief 
that microfinance should be removed from rhetoric of perfect poverty eradication 
tool and demoted to one tactic of poverty alleviation among many.  
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